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BIG MONEY IN TEXAS JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS: THE SICKNESS AND
ITS REMEDIES
Paul D. Carrington*
A chief justice of another state not long ago declared that there is no
method of selecting and retaining judges that is worth a damn.' He is not
the first to express that wisdom.2 A familiar dilemma is found in the
tension between the competing needs for judicial independence and for
democratic accountability. While there may be no good method of select-
ing and retaining judges, there is a worst method, and Texas is among the
states to find it. The worst method is one where judges qualify for their
jobs by raising very large sums of money from lawyers, litigants, and spe-
cial interest groups, and retain their offices only by continuing to raise
such funds.
I. THE DILEMMA OF INDEPENDENCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
I have spent much of my professional life working with federal judges
who exercise much power over their fellow citizens and who enjoy
the independence of life tenure in their employment. I yield only to
some of them in my admiration for that august group, but cannot quite
share the feeling of William Howard Taft, who while President of the
United States explained his longing to return to the bench. "I love judges
and I love courts. They are my ideals. They typify on earth what we shall
meet hereafter in heaven under a just God."'3 True, I remember Sarah
Tilghman Hughes as an ornament to both the state and federal bench in
Dallas, and she might have met President Taft's description. She seemed
to me wise, courageous, and kind, and if heaven is full of her sort as I
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University; Reporter, Task Force on State
Courts of Citizens for Independent Courts, and member of Planning Committee, Ameri-
can Bar Association Conferences on Judicial Independence and Accountability. This arti-
cle served as the basis for the Roy Ray Lecture presented at the Southern Methodist
University School of Law on March 30, 1999. Some of the thoughts expressed here are
more fully developed in PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A
PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999).
1. THE ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION, PRESERVING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JU-
DICIARY 15 (1998).
2. See, e.g. Roger Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges?, 53 VA. L. REV. 1266
(1967).
3. Speech to Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, NEW YORK EVENING POST, October 6,
1911.
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remember her, it is indeed a good place. I salute her memory. But wish
as I might, I cannot ascribe a full quota of those merits to every federal
judge.
Although dubious about President Taft's appraisal, I can say that the
federal judges with whom I have worked are admirably independent in
the important sense that they are all but invulnerable to either bribery or
intimidation in any form. If and when federal district judges fail in their
duty to administer the law with courtesy and dispatch, it is for want of
moral courage, judgment, or intellect, not because of extrinsic pressures
brought to bear upon them. And when the Supreme Court of the United
States makes mistakes, as often it does, and sometimes pretty terrible
ones at that,4 it is never because the moral and political judgment of the
Justices has been overridden by the hope of reward or the fear of punish-
ment. We can be sure they have done their best.
This is no small boast. Francis Lieber rightly observed that while the
ancients could not create an independent judiciary, we are unable to ade-
quately appreciate the one we have.5 In a world in which the intimidation
and bribery of judges is rampant from one continent to the next, it seems
almost wistful of the United Nations to declare, as it has,6 that it is a basic
human right to have one's case decided by a judge who is not subject to
bribery or intimidation. Pity the Russians and Ukrainians! Pity the Chi-
nese! Pity the Nigerians and the Congolese! Pity our neighbors in much
of Latin America!
But there can be too much judicial independence. An excess is most
obvious and most painful when judges are not even adequately accounta-
ble to one another, i.e., when there is an absence of internal accountabil-
ity. As a youth, I read about the infamous Judge Roy Bean of Langtry,
Texas.7 When a regular patron of the bar owned and managed by Judge
Bean got drunk and shot a Chinese railroad worker, Judge Bean read the
Texas statute and concluded that it failed to specify the killing of a Chi-
nese person as a crime and acquitted his friend. Judge Bean was accus-
4. For examples and discussion, see Paul D. Carrington, Restoring the Vitality of State
and Local Politics: Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L.
REV. 397, 419-53 (1999).
5. See 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 363 (Theodore Woolsey
ed., 2d ed., 1875).
6. In 1948, the UN promulgated its Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article
X provided that "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations and
of any criminal charge against him." G. A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
doc. a/810 (1948). This was sweepingly elaborated in 1985 in its statement of Basic Princi-
ples on the Independence of the Judiciary. See UNITED NATIONS, SEVENTH UNITED NA-
TIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS,
BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/146
(1985), reprinted in CHERIF BASSIOUNI: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF THE UNITED NATIONS NORMS
AND STANDARDS 245-48 (1994).
7. See generally, RUEL MCDANIEL, VINEGARROON, THE SAGA OF JUDGE Roy
BEAN: "LAw WEST OF THE PECOS" (1936); EVERETr LLOYD, LAW WEST OF THE PECOS:
THE STORY OF Roy BEAN (1936).
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tomed to imposing stiff fines, and he even imposed fines on corpses found
in his venue amounting to whatever sums could be found on them. The
fines, when paid, went straight to his pocket. When Governor Hogg sug-
gested that the money belonged to the state of Texas, Judge Bean told the
Governor to take care of matters in Austin and to leave him in charge of
matters in Langtry. Judge Bean, it can be said, was independent of the
law, but not of bribery or of intimidation. A system permitting the de-
gree of independence he enjoyed is, to borrow Lon Fuller's metaphor, a
legal system only in the Pickwickian sense that a void contract is one kind
of contract.8
Even when judges are accountable to one another, there is still the
problem of their accountability to the people of a self-governing republic.
While admiring the law-abiding independence of the federal judiciary, I
am still true to my agrarian heritage. Like many others who can remem-
ber when Dallas County was mostly a cotton patch, I believe language in
the Declaration of Independence that I memorized and recited in school
about the right of the people to self-government. I believe in the need for
the right to jury trial as a restraint on the power of judges to rule our
lives. Thus, with the antifederalists of the eighteenth century, the Jack-
sonians and Populists of the nineteenth, and many of the Progressives of
the early decades of this century, I am mistrustful of public officers com-
missioned for life. I am especially doubtful when they treat opaque legal
texts as their commissions to reorganize the social order according to
their lights as members of an elite ruling class. In expressing this rustic
sentiment, I side with Thomas Jefferson, 9 Andrew Jackson,10 Abraham
Lincoln," Theodore Roosevelt, 12 and Franklin Roosevelt, 13 each of
whom confronted arrogant federal judges who were inattentive to our
rights as citizens to govern ourselves. This sentiment is still very widely
shared in the United States and explains the massive resistance to state
constitutional reforms designed to immunize judiciaries from political
accountability.
Indeed, since 1840, over two hundred constitutional conventions in var-
ious states and in foreign countries have conferred constitutional status
on judiciaries, but none has conferred as much independence on judges
exercising that power as the United States Constitution.' 4 In that one
salient respect, our federal constitution has been rejected as a model for
8. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964).
9. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in High-
est State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 88 & n.56 (1999).
10. See MARQUIS JAMES, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 260-64 (1938) (discussing Jack-
son's refusal to comply with a habeas corpus order in the case of Louis Louaillier for which
he was later held in contempt of court); see also WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, ANDREW
JACKSON 227 & n.4 (1889) (discussing Jackson's refusal to take executive action in support
of a Supreme Court judgment favoring Cherokees).
11. See 4 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARS 279-81 (1939).
12. See Carrington, supra note 9, at 94 & nn.106-112.
13. See id. at 95 & n.113.
14. A recent compilation is CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Al-
bert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., 1999).
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others. Most state constitutions make judges accountable to the electo-
rate. Judges in most American states, like those in Texas, have to stand
for office, and each is allowed, as I recall one judge demanding, "to run
on his own demerits." Meanwhile, however, since the time of Roscoe
Pound and John Henry Wigmore, many American lawyers have been
pointing to massive, seemingly insoluble problems with judicial elections
and urging various alternatives optimistically denoted as "merit selec-
tion." 15 Most of the problems with judicial elections are associated with
threats to the independence of the judiciary, and thus to the integrity of
our law. In whatever form, elections tend to empower persons or groups
outside the judiciary to reward or to intimidate judges for their decisions,
and thus to bend the administration of the law.
II. THE ADVENT OF BIG MONEY
It has been said that money is the mother's milk of American politics.
Fundraising was not, however, a salient feature of contested elections in
the nineteenth century when Texas and other states opted to elect judges.
A genuine crisis is presented when an election is for a judicial office and
the sums spent are so large as to dwarf the fifty or hundred dollar contri-
butions that most citizens might consider making to express support for a
candidate or an idea.
Forty-four years ago, I participated in a judicial campaign in Dallas.
There was a sense shared by many Dallas lawyers that one of the judges
in the old courthouse needed to be replaced. Members of the Dallas Jun-
ior Bar identified a suitable candidate to oppose him. We put up a few
billboards, pasted fliers on telephone poles, and passed out small hand-
bills. Our successful campaign cost a few thousand dollars. There were
no contributions of size. My contribution was to paste a few posters on
utility poles. To be sure, such an election left much to be desired. Voters
had little information and scant interest, in part because no issues were
presented for public debate. While statewide campaigns were at that
time more expensive than the one in which I was engaged, there was little
cause for concern that anyone was buying our courts.
All that has changed dramatically in the last two decades, especially
with respect to statewide races. Beginning in California,16 but in state after
state, the amount of money being spent on statewide judicial campaigns
has increased exponentially. Judicial campaign expenditures have been
15. See generally MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1990); HARRY STUMPF &
JOHN CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1992); Maura Ann Schoshinski, Towards
an Independent, Fair and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elec-
tions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (1994); Kyle D. Cheek, The Bench, The Bar, and the
Political Economy of Justice, Texas Supreme Court Elections, 1980-1994 at 18-25 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas (Dallas)) (on file with author).
16. For a brief account of the developments in California in the 1970s and 1980s, see
Carrington, supra note 9, at 81-87 (1999).
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doubling every biennium in several states, including Texas. 17 It has be-
come increasingly evident that whole judiciaries can be bought by those
with money to spend. Megabuck campaigns are insidiously destructive of
the trust of citizens in their legal institutions.
Judges who raise large campaign funds are not on that that account
corrupt. Many, I have no doubt, often decide cases contrary to the con-
tentions of their benefactors. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to
believe that campaign contributions have no bearing on the outcomes of
cases. Polling data in Texas and other statesI8 confirm that most citizens
believe that contributors are getting something for their money. Even if
judges are never influenced to favor their contributors in contested cases,
those who exercise political responsibility as state Supreme Court Justices
do, will in their decisions reflect the ideological and political perspectives
of their constituents.
There are at least two causes of this malign modern development.
First, Americans have become legal realists and expect judges in state
supreme courts to make many decisions laden with social and political
significance, i.e., decisions in which self-governing citizens demand a say.
This has made high court judgeships increasingly visible to those seeking
to use their money to shape the ideology of the state government. In-
deed, for some with money to spend for that purpose, judicial elections
may be the best buy because the electorate may be especially ill-informed
and apathetic about the issues presented in judicial elections.
Second, technological developments have made a huge difference in
the effectiveness of campaign expenditures. The political advertisement
inserted into commercial television programming during a ball game or a
soap opera is a powerful tool, all but obsolescing such homely political
tools as billboards, handbills, word of mouth, and even traditional public
speaking on radio or television by the candidates themselves. Expert
consultants using focus groups can craft advertisements, that for a half
minute, occupy all the senses of the casual viewer attracted to the screen
by high-priced entertainment. The experts have mastered the art and
skill of transmitting disinformation by this means and are especially adept
at directing negative or hostile sentiments toward political adversaries. If
well done, such advertisements "melt down."'19 That is a technical phrase
employed by social scientists to describe the process by which we forget
the source of disinformation and come to believe that it came to us from
a legitimate newscast, perhaps from Walter Cronkite himself. Because of
the low level of voter interest in judicial campaigns, judicial candidates
are especially vulnerable to blitzkrieg by insidious spot advertising on
17. Id. at 106 & nn.188-190; see also ABA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, PART Two 89-107 (1998).
18. For a review of the Texas polling data, see SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (February 23,
1999 at 6-10) <http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/campaign.htm>.




commercial television. Such an attack can be effectively resisted, if at all,
only by a counterattack employing the same weaponry. But air-time on
commercial television is very expensive, and so are the consultants and
focus groups. Moreover, they require planning; an effective television
campaign therefore requires substantial front-end financing.
For these reasons, it would be imprudent, even foolish, for a person
serious about trying to win or hold an elective office on a state supreme
court to enter the campaign without a large supply of cash. Even in a
state of average size like Alabama, a six-year term on the Supreme Court
now costs a couple of million dollars, 20 and the price is rising. Several
multiples of that sum have been spent in Texas and California.2' Election
campaigns conducted by television advertising are arms races, and there
are no operative strategic arms limitations. Unless there is a saturation
point not yet visible, it appears that we are headed to a time when Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of Texas will need to raise a couple of million
dollars a year from lawyers, litigants, and interest groups if they are seri-
ous about keeping their seats on the court.
Some citizens and even some judges seem to view this development
without concern. I suppose some share an idea that was advanced by that
notable Dallas oil billionaire and political philosopher, the late H. L.
Hunt, who, in his single published work, Alpaca,2 2 rhapsodized about the
virtues of a society in which citizens cast multiple votes in proportion to
their wealth. With the help of modern technology, we have come a long
way toward fulfilling Hunt's dream with respect to the political roles of
some of our highest state courts. The legal system in Texas, whatever the
reality, appears to belong to rich folks or groups. We are told that the
celebrated Governor of Texas applauds the present system of electing
judges and will resist change; if that is so, it would indicate that he shares
the political philosophy of H. L. Hunt, a fact that should be called to the
attention of voters in the coming presidential campaign.
The long-term consequences of subjecting our courts to the control of
monied interests are dismal to contemplate. Over time, few rich folks or
groups will benefit from the resulting disaffection and distrust of fellow
citizens. Capitalism and the market economy depend on political stabil-
ity. Political stability in turn depends on the perceptions of the people
that the law is their law, made by their representatives for their benefit
and administered without fear or favor. Those connections were well un-
derstood in this country in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, if not
by H. L. Hunt and his fellow travelers. When de Tocqueville spoke of
American lawyers and judges as aristocrats,2 3 he was speaking not of
their elevated status, but of their political responsibility for mediating be-
20. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (1998).
21. See id.
22. Published in 1960.
23. See I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 297 (Henry Reeve
trans., New York, 1841).
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tween diverse groups by preventing those with wealth and power from
overbearing those without. That stabilizing function cannot be effectively
performed by courts that appear to be controlled by monied interests.
III. PRESCRIPTIONS
What can be done to reverse the trend toward megabuck judicial cam-
paigns? There are no magic solutions. Whatever we do, we will still be
left with a defective method of selecting and retaining judges. The best
we can hope for is to maintain a judiciary that is reasonably independent
yet reasonably accountable to the people of the state, and not a cause for
alienation and mistrust by those whose cases must be judged.
To that modest end, I endorse the following proposals. First, Texas
should substantially tighten and reinforce the rules requiring judges to
disqualify themselves from sitting on cases involving the rights or inter-
ests of persons or groups who have made large campaign contributions to
candidates for judicial office. Thus, I endorse the recommendations pub-
lished this year by the Judicial Campaign Finance Study Committee ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court of Texas.24 Second, Texas should provide
limited public funding to facilitate statewide judicial campaigns on the
condition that candidates receiving assistance accept appropriate re-
straints on campaign spending and methods. Thus, I support the public
funding provisions in a bill proposed for enactment by the Texas legisla-
ture by Representative Gallego.25 Third, Texas should substantially in-
crease the length of the terms of its elected judges.
A. DISQUALIFICATION RULES
The Texas Judicial Campaign Fairness Act of 199526 was a useful re-
sponse to the problem of which I speak, but not an adequate one. The
Act limits contributions to judicial campaigns, limits the times within
which campaign contributions may be received, and imposes elaborate
disclosure requirements on the campaigns of judicial candidates. The ma-
jor inadequacies of that legislation are that it fails to reach direct spend-
ing on judicial elections by political organizations and other interest
groups, and that its provisions are enforceable only by civil and criminal
sanctions imposed on violators rather than by requiring the recusal of
judges receiving illegal support.
The American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct has been
adopted in major part by the Texas Supreme Court as the law of this
state.27 An ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions released
a report in July 1998 recommending seven reforms of that code bearing
24. See Supreme Court of Texas, supra note 18.
25. Tex. H.B. 10, 76th Leg. R.S. (1999).
26. See Acts effective June 16, 1995, 74th Leg. R.S., ch. 763, § 1 (effective Sept. 1, 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 479 §§ 1-3, codified as TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.151-253.176 (Vernon 1998)).
27. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. title 2, subt. G, app. B (Vernon 1998).
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on campaign contributions by lawyers. 28 Some of these, such as limits on
campaign contributions, were previously enacted in the Texas legislation
of 1995. But the ABA Task Force also recommended the disqualification
of a judge in a case involving a party or counsel who exceeded the limit
on contributions and restraints on the appointment by judges of lawyers
who exceed the contribution limits. These are not presently features of
Texas law. Some members of that Task Force, including Tom Phillips, the
Chief Justice of Texas, recommended three additional reforms: (1) a rule
preventing a judge from retaining unspent campaign funds as a war chest
for future campaigns; (2) a rule forbidding a political party or action
group from circumnavigating contribution limits by actively supporting
the judge through campaign expenditures; and (3) a rule requiring dis-
qualification of the judge even if the judge was unaware of the excessive
contribution.
A Study Committee appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas has now
also tackled the problem. It wisely recommends that the Texas Supreme
Court use its rulemaking power to prohibit a judge from sitting on cases
involving parties who have contributed to the judge in violation of the
1995 Act.29 In accordance with the recommendations of the ABA group,
the Study Committee proposes to enhance the disclosure requirements,
and recommends legislation to impose those requirements on "direct ex-
penditures" by persons or organizations seeking to influence the outcome
of judicial elections.30 Therefore a judge may also be disqualified from
sitting on a case involving a party who has contributed substantially to a
group or organization engaged in direct spending, i.e. spending moneys
that are not contributed to a campaign and subjected to the control of the
candidate. The Study Committee's recommendations should be adopted.
I suggest two possible addenda. Professor Roy Schotland, the reporter
for the ABA group, has called attention to the need to limit post-election
fundraising. This would seem to be necessary to prevent the accumula-
tion of war chests.31 Also, the Public Citizen Litigation Group has noted
that it is important to aggregate the contributions of lawyers and their
clients, so that if a lawyer and his clients in a particular case contribute
more than the limit to a judge's campaign, or spend directly more than
that amount, the judge would be disqualified from sitting on their case.
While the Report speaks to the need to aggregate the contributions of
colleagues and relatives, it could be more explicit in aggregating the con-
tributions of parties with those of their lawyers. This problem is compli-
cated by the fact that the Campaign Fairness Act imposes different limits
on law firm contributions from those imposed on individual lawyers. I
am not persuaded that law firms, any more than corporations or labor
unions, should be allowed to make political contributions.
28. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 17.
29. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 18-29.
30. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 15-17.
31. See Letter of Roy Schotland to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Texas, March
5, 1999.
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Sweeping disqualification rules will go far to correct the problem, but
not far enough. They will function best in regard to trial courts. There
are individuals and interest groups or associations willing to spend large
sums to influence the election of judges to the supreme court of a state
where they do not appear as parties. For example, it appears that mil-
lions were spent in Tennessee in recent years to secure a state supreme
court that could be expected to reapportion legislative and Congressional
districts to assure maximum success for the spenders' partisan interests.
A disqualification rule would have had no effect there. Nor will disquali-
fication rules discourage a labor union, a state medical association, or an
association of trial lawyers from raising large sums from their members,
even those who will not themselves be participants in cases having high
political salience.
B. PUBLIC FINANCE: THE VOTERS' GUIDE
Because the disqualification rules are an insufficient response to the
crisis, some public funding of judicial campaigns is needed. The Texas
Study Committee expressed opposition to this idea, but gave no reason
for that opposition. The Committee applauded the efforts of the State
Bar to provide a voters' guide to judicial candidacies, but stopped short of
recommending that public funds be used to make those efforts effective.
Public funding of elections was necessitated by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo, decided in
1976.32 The Court constitutionalized the right of candidates, citizens, and
interest groups to spend money to influence the outcome of elections, but
upheld restraints imposed as conditions on the receipt of public financial
support. Public funding is a familiar feature of presidential election
law,33 two states have recently adopted public funding of campaigns for
legislative and executive offices,34 referenda in two other states have fol-
lowed suit,35 and Roper polls show that two voters out of three favor
public funding, while only one in four oppose it.36 Wisconsin presently
funds judicial candidacies. 37 Texas should take a modest first step in that
direction, as Mr. Gallego has proposed. I do not suggest that Texas give
money directly to candidates to spend as they please (although Wisconsin
now does so), but that funds be provided to a judicial election commis-
32. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976).
33. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (1994).
34. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (West Supp. 1997); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2851-2856 (Michie Supp. 1997). See generally Michael E. Campion, The
Maine Clean Election Act: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
2391 (1998).
35. See Bruce Lambert, After Guiliani's Success with Campaign Finance Referendum, a
New Battle Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at Bi; The Voice of the Voters, BOSTON
GLOBE, November 8, 1998, at D6; State Lottery Stays, Cockfighting Goes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Nov. 4, 1998.
36. See, e.g., 1996 Roper Center Public Opinion Online #0270818, Question 027.
37. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 17, at 112; see also Final Report of the
Commission of Judicial Elections and Ethics, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 81 (1999).
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sion to use to give Texas voters the best opportunity to make informed
choices among judicial candidates.
First, I envision with Mr. Gallego 38 that the state would publish and
distribute to each registered voter a voter's guide containing information
about candidates for statewide judicial office. Such guides have long
been provided in several states;39 in fact, the Texas Bar initiated such a
document in the 1998 election, but it was not widely distributed. 40 A
good voter guide contains biographical information, photographs, and
personal statements. They sometimes also include the results of bar polls
or other disinterested evaluations.41 They could be expanded to include
endorsements by groups that play by rules limiting expenditures on "issue
advocacy" advertising not controlled by the candidates themselves. Can-
didates that do not agree to conform to rules established by the legisla-
ture would be listed in the guide, but without their personal statements.
As Roy Schotland has proposed, the distribution of such guides could and
should be partially funded by the federal government through a limited
franking privilege allowing each state's commission to use the post office
for one distribution without a postage charge.
Second, I propose that the judicial election commission stage a public
debate at which the candidates for each statewide judicial office would be
invited to appear, make a personal statement, and comment on their dif-
ferences. Of course, judicial candidates could not speak to issues arising
in litigation, but they could discuss the role of courts, speak to their re-
spective qualifications, and manifest their relative awareness of issues of
judicial administration. This debate could be recorded on audio and
video tapes made available at no cost, or at nominal cost, to radio and
television stations agreeing to air them unedited and without charge to
the candidates. The tapes could also be provided to individual voters or
to neighborhood, church, or interest groups. Candidates participating in
this presentation or publishing their personal statements in the voters'
guide would be required to forego the use of costly spot advertising on
commercial television.
Third, I suggest that the judicial election commission be supplied with
some funds to be used as needed to buy television advertising to counter-
act scurrilous campaigning by judicial candidates or "issue-advocacy"
groups who refuse to abide by reasonable restraints on campaign meth-
ods. It would be the hope and expectation that these funds would not be
used, and that their availability would have a prophylactic effect on abu-
sive and destructive campaign methods. This function was performed in
38. See Subchapter E of his bill, cited in note 25, at Sec. 259.131 et seq.
39. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges'
Robes the Emporer's Clothes of American Democracy, 2 J. L. & POL. 57, 127-28 (1985).
40. See Study Committee Report, supra note 18, at 39.
41. See, e.g., Tennessee Judicial Evaluation Commission, Tennessee Appellate Judges
Evaluation Report (1998). See generally Susan Keilitz & Judith W. McBride, Judicial Per-
formance Evaluation Comes of Age, 16 STATE CT. J. 4 (1992).
[Vol. 53
BIG MONEY IN TEXAS
1998 in Georgia by the state bar association.42
I limit my proposals, as does Mr. Gallego, to statewide campaigns for
judicial office. A case can be made for similar funding for local judicial
elections, especially those conducted in large metropolitan districts. I do
not urge such a measure at this time for two reasons. The first is the cost.
The second is a lesser need. While lower courts are also political institu-
tions, the political content of their work is less than that of the highest
state courts. Hence, they are much less attractive targets for groups seek-
ing to buy the state's judiciary with megabuck advertising campaigns,
and, for them, the proposed changes in the disqualification rules will be
much more effective. If we can secure the independence of the highest
courts from the system of rewards and punishments associated with high-
priced electronic campaigns, we will have achieved most of the goal.
Also, it is possible that we may learn from funding statewide elections,
techniques that are equally or even more useful in conducting local
elections.
The Texas Study Commission would leave it to the State Bar to bear
full responsibility for the voters' guide. Imaginably, the State Bar could
not only distribute a guide, but also conduct a debate, and rebut costly
spot television advertising in judicial campaigns. Thus, the bar in Georgia
in 1998 managed by threat of public rebuttal to deter a judicial candidate
from misrepresenting the record of an incumbent member of the state
supreme court.43 Such an initiative could be funded with a modest in-
crease in bar dues. Or perhaps the lawyers participating in the recent
tobacco settlement would like to endow such a program.
C. LIMITED TERMS
I believe that no state elects judges for shorter terms than Texas, four
years for trial judges44 and six years for appellate judges,45 as established
by the state constitution. Those terms were set in the nineteenth century
when it was assumed that the only way to remove judges not suited to
judicial office was to defeat them in the next election.
In contemporary circumstances, those terms are much too short. Judges
serving short terms may be perpetually engaged in fundraising, and the
funds must come from lawyers and litigants appearing before them. The
promise of reward and the threat of punishment at the polls must there-
fore be a constant presence in many Texas courtrooms. The exceptions
are those judges who have seats made safe by the configurations of parti-
san politics.
42. See Jonathan Ringel, Campaign Attack Tests New Rules, FULTON CouNTY DAILY
REP., June 19, 1998 at 1-2.
43. See Jeanne Cummings, Candidates Learn to Defuse Outside Groups' Attack Ads,
WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998 at A20.
44. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 7, 15.
45. See id. §§ 2, 4, 6.
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Texas, like many other states, has created a State Commission on Judi-
cial Conduct having responsibility for auditing the performance of
judges.46 I cannot evaluate the performance of the Texas Commission,
but I believe that in some other states such commissions have been very
effective in weeding out serious problems of judicial misconduct such as
drunkenness, sexual harassment, abuse of parties or witnesses, and cor-
ruption. If the Texas Commission is not fully effective, it can be made so.
As a result, it is not necessary to make trial judges stand for election so
often. Their terms could be doubled or even tripled in length. As a con-
sequence, the need for fundraising would be greatly reduced. Instead, a
judicial term would contain many years in which fundraising would be a
remote concern for judges and for the parties appearing before them.
The case for lengthening the terms of the appellate judges is even
stronger than for trial judges because of the greater expense of their cam-
paigns. Doubling the length of the terms of the members of the two high
courts and the courts of appeals would halve the problem of expensive
campaigns without making any fundamental changes in the democratic
accountability of the courts. It is also a consideration that churning the
membership of appellate courts destabilizes the law; the rotation of
judges through the highest court of a state can disable the institution from
functioning as a court of law.47 Moreover, the problem of judicial disci-
pline is even less a problem in a multi-judge court; seldom is there an
urgent need to remove a judge from such a court.
For the latter reasons, New York48 and the District of Columbia,49 for
examples, provide much longer terms for members of their highest
courts. Even with twelve-year terms for the Supreme Court of Texas, the
voters would be electing one or two Justices each biennium, not counting
the vacancies to be filled. Texas should reconsider short judicial terms as
needless threats to judicial independence.
If mild reforms such as those I have proposed are not forthcoming,
then more radical proposals must be considered. It would then be time to
review the various merit selection schemes that have in the past failed to
find favor in Texas. In the alternative, if trial judges must stand for reelec-
tion every four years, it should be only a retention election, i.e., one in
which they are not opposed by a rival candidate. The retention election
might be a satisfactory solution for trial courts, but recent experience in
other states suggests that it is not satisfactory for highest courts, because
judge sitting on such courts are sitting ducks for electronic blitzkriegs, in
part because they have no adversary to attack. If the retention election is
introduced, it would still be necessary to impose rigorous disclosure re-
quirements on those spending to influence the outcome of the elections,
46. See id. § 1-A.
47. See Cheek, supra note 15, at 1140157 (giving many examples of fluctuations in
Texas tort law resulting from changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court).
48. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 (McKinney 1983).
49. D. C. CODE ANN. § 431 (1981).
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and to disqualify judges from sitting on cases involving those who spend
large sums to support or oppose their retention.
By one means or another, the legislature, the Supreme Court of Texas,
the State Bar of Texas, and the people of Texas, must not rest until the
problem of megabuck judicial campaigns has been effectively addressed.
The solutions devised will be imperfect, and will cause other problems,
some of them unforeseen, and will in time perhaps be condemned as "not
worth a damn." But it is the nature of legal institutions to be imperfect
and needful of perpetual reform. As Felix Frankfurter once observed,
great laws governing judicial institutions, unlike great poems, are not
written for all time.
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